

IBSEC-AR/8
15 August 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Eighth Annual Report of the Security Committee

There is attached for the information of the Board the Eighth Annual Report of the Security Committee. This report covers the activities of the Security Committee from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967.

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W. Howard J. Osborn
Chairman

Attachment

Group 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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downgrading and
declassification

The Committee also initiated new studies during this period, including a detailed examination of the Personal History Statement (PHS), a review of security training films, and an examination of the community's procedures for the security review of books and articles prepared by employees and consultants.

The problem of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence in the press has continued to be a major concern of the Committee. One special meeting was devoted exclusively to the problem as it affects the Special Intelligence field, with the resulting difficulties created for the U. S. collection effort. There are simply no ready solutions to some of these problems and only continual alertness and constant security consciousness can help stop the trickle of leaks which frustrate our security procedures, lessen the effectiveness of our collection efforts and strengthen the hands of opposition services.


IV. ACTIVITIES

A. Annual Report of the Measures Taken by Members of the Intelligence Community to Enhance the Nation's Counter-intelligence Posture

This annual report, covering calendar 1966, was submitted to the USIB Chairman on 30 December 1966, and was forwarded to the White House and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board (PFIAB) on 12 January 1967. The report noted the physical, technical and personnel security measures taken by the intelligence community with special emphasis on overseas activity.

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C. Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices
Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information

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One of the recommendations made by PFIAB in its analysis of the case was the establishment of uniform personnel security criteria for all personnel having access to sensitive information. A working group of the Security Committee formulated a first draft of the standards which were then reviewed in depth by the full Committee. The approved draft was then considered by both the SIGINT and COMOR Committees and further changes were

made. The finished document received USIB approval and was issued as DCID 1/14 on 23 June 1967. This represented a major breakthrough for the Security Committee's efforts to standardize personnel security criteria and should serve as a springboard for similar uniform practices in other areas of security concern.

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E. A Study of Provocations and Harassments against Attaches and other U. S. Officials in Sov Bloc Areas

For some time the Committee has been receiving from its

Members reports of harassments and provocations directed against military attaches, U. S. civilian employees and private citizens in the Soviet Bloc. After detailed analysis, a study of this problem has been completed and approved by the Committee. The finished paper will soon be forwarded to USIB for approval of its dissemination to the intelligence community for use as a briefing aid for all travelers to denied areas.

F. The Use of the Personal History Statement (PHS) in the Intelligence Community

The Committee has established a working group consisting of senior investigative specialists from each Member agency to consider the variety of PHS' now in use in the community, and whether a uniform PHS is desirable or feasible. The working group will deal with the PHS in all its aspects, as a personnel application - a basis for investigation and a counterintelligence record.

G. Establishment of Uniform Criteria for the Release, Control and Dissemination of Personal Protection Methods to Foreign Governments

At the request of the Secret Service, the Committee reviewed the practices of those Member agencies involved in

training foreign protective services charged with the safety of chiefs of state. The Secret Service was concerned that certain protective measures they employ to safeguard the President not be disseminated. A working group of those Members involved in such training developed a list of subjects which will not be disseminated to any foreign service.